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Abstract:
Despite substantial research that advocates the “right” portfolio of new product development initiatives
for the firm, one important aspect has been overlooked: creating a portfolio of new product development
initiatives is not equivalent to choosing from a menu of initiatives. Rather, these initiatives are defined by
and within the organization. Thus, portfolio selection rests upon two challenges: the cross-functional nature
of collaborative tasks, and the role of explicit and implicit incentives on innovative outcomes. This paper
explores how these factors ultimately determine the initiatives an organization pursues. We abstract a new
product development organization as two functional managers who report to senior management, and analyze
the strategic interactions between all three stakeholders. Senior management decides whether to empower
the functional managers to define the initiative, and how to reward them contingent on the outcome. We
evaluate how the asymmetry of information regarding each function’s capability, and the explicit and implicit
rewards and penalties imposed on the functional managers affect the upfront resource allocation. We find
a profound effect of the information asymmetry: the set of initiatives the firm deems profitable is reduced,
thus impeding the organization’s potential to innovate. To counter such a shortcoming, senior management
may optimally misalign the objectives of the stakeholders.
Keywords: NPD Portfolio, NPD Process, Incentives in Innovation, Tolerance for Failure, Technology Ma-
nagement.
1 Introduction
In the early 2000’s both Wyeth Pharmaceuticals and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) set out to restructure
their research and development (R&D) organizations to be more effective. Both firms identified
the locus of decision rights–who in the organization makes key decisions–as a fundamental driver
of their R&D organization’s effectiveness. Although both firms sought to change the locus of
decision rights and the associated incentives, the manner in which they sought to change them
differed substantially. Specifically, Wyeth sought to restructure their organization so that resource
commitments were determined in a centralized fashion and incentives could be considered more
harsh (Huckman et al. 2010). The emphasis was on standardization and control. In contrast, GSK
chose to decentralize decision rights, empower managers, and to foster an “entrepreneurial spirit”
(Huckman and Strick 2010). Indeed, GSK sought to utilize the specialized knowledge of scientists
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who were closest to the development process. Following Wyeth’s restructuring the number of new
drug applications declined, subsequently the number of therapeutic areas Wyeth pursued was cut
in half, and the next year the firm was acquired by Pfizer3. In contrast, when GSK commenced
its restructuring they had only two products in late stage development, yet, eight years later they
had thirty four drugs and vaccines in late stage development (Garnier 2008, p. 1). Although we
cannot draw direct conclusions on the effect the restructuring had on either outcome, still, a valid
question remains: what impact could the locus of decision rights, incentives, and the culture of the
firm have had on achieving such outcomes?
The story we have presented is not unique: it echoes observations and accounts of typical new
product development (NPD) restructuring scenarios that abound in the popular business press and
in case studies (Bower 1970, Loch and Mihm 1996, Bower and Gilbert 2005, Garnier 2008, Huckman
and Strick 2010, Huckman et al. 2010). Some common explanations for outcomes similar to the
one presented lay blame on the individuals, e.g., “managers were too risk averse to meet the firm’s
innovation objectives” or “managers pursued their own private objectives, which were misaligned
with the firm’s strategy.” True, these explanations may, in fact, be plausible, however, they are
exogenous to the product development process itself. They imply the only way to fix the “problem”
is to hire new people. We acknowledge these explanations but seek an alternative explanation, one
that includes the possibility that the cause of such outcomes could be the structure of the NPD
organization itself.
Economic theory has generated a significant stream of literature on agency (see Holmstrom
1982, Grossman and Hart 1983, Aghion and Tirole 1997, Gibbons 2005). The basic insight remains
bold and robust: parties that are responsible for the execution of tasks with uncertain outcomes are
risk averse; to induce risk-taking behavior, extra pay-for-performance compensation is necessary.
However, the reality, as depicted through much of the recent NPD literature, points to strong limi-
tations regarding the application of agency rules. NPD outcomes rely on (complex) interdependent
cross-functional information, which is non-verifiable and dispersed among different organizational
units (Hauser 1998, Tatikonda and Rosenthal 2000, Mihm et al. 2003, Sosa et al. 2004, Mihm 2010,
Schlapp et al. 2015). Moreover, NPD performance critically depends on the manner in which uncer-
3As Huckman (2010) notes, “it was not clear whether the [restructuring] had any effect on these outcomes in
either direction” (p. 13), still the outcome is noteworthy.
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tainty and information asymmetry is manifest at different levels in a firm’s organizational hierarchy
(Sosa et al. 2002, Andersen and Joglekar 2005, Blindenbach-Driessen 2015, Hutchison-Krupat and
Kavadias 2014, Hutchison-Krupat 2017).
More recent research explores how the structure of an organization interacts with the product
development process, and the NPD portfolio in particular. Anderson and Joglekar (2005) provide
a framework that outlines the dynamic role of multiple sources of uncertainty, and how they affect
decision making at different levels of an organization’s hierarchy. Chao et al. (2009) investigate
an organizational hierarchy in which the funding authority, financial incentives, and the implicit
incentives (career concerns) affect the NPD portfolio’s balance between exploration based and
exploitation based initiatives. Thus, in Chao et al.’s (2009) setting, the decisions are made by
a single manager who allocates resources between two predetermined initiatives. In contrast, we
focus on two collaborative functional managers, who together must decide whether a single initiative
should be included in the organization’s portfolio.
Manso (2011) also studies the impact of implicit incentives, specifically, the importance of a
firm’s need to have a temporal tolerance for failure to enable explorative innovation. He argues that
some (positive) reward for explorative (radical) efforts that fail, provides incentives for risk-averse
agents to pursue such efforts, despite the availability of a less risky alternative. Thus, he justifies
the need for a failure-tolerant organization, but does not discuss its implications for the selection
of strategic initiatives. Within an experimental setting, Hutchison-Krupat and Chao (2014) study
a manager’s willingness to allocate resources to an innovative initiative as it relates to the penalty
they could incur if they experience a failed initiative. In particular, they evaluate how tolerance
for failure and shared decision making interacts with financial penalties and rewards to affect an
individual’s resource allocation decision on an uncertain NPD initiative. We build on this work to
expose the way in which a low tolerance for failure can impact the selection decision, and of equal
import, the set of initiatives an organization would even consider viable options to explore.
We develop a principal-multi-agent model to analyze how the collaborative nature of NPD
affect the firm’s4 portfolio decisions. Subsequently, we study how both explicit financial incentives
(e.g. bonus plans) and implicit organizational norms (e.g. the tolerance for failure) moderate
the portfolio composition. Specifically, we show how different organizational norms either enable
4We will use the terms senior management, firm and VP interchangeably throughout the paper.
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or inhibit senior management to include an initiative in their NPD portfolio. Indeed, we find
there is an important NPD-specific analog to Markowitz’s (1952) observation that each individual
investor’s optimal portfolio depends on their risk attitude: the portfolio that each firm is able to
pursue depends on the organizational norms and structure of the NPD organization.
Overall, we make a three-fold contribution to the literature: First, on a conceptual basis, we
depart from the “traditional” perspective that views the selection decision for an NPD portfolio as
a choice from a “menu of initiatives”. Instead, we advocate that organizational dynamics play an
important role in defining which initiatives are even placed on the menu. Second, we identify that
the asymmetry of information regarding the cross-functional capabilities, combined with the stra-
tegic interaction across disciplines, may inhibit the organization’s ability to pursue risky innovative
endeavors. Finally, we discuss the relative efficiency of formal versus informal means by which the
organization can affect their limited ability to pursue risky initiatives.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce the formal properties of our model. Our focus is on the front-end
definition of an NPD initiative.
2.1 Functions, capabilities, and the initiative
We consider an organization where senior leadership (the principal) must decide whether or not
to pursue an innovative initiative that, if successful, would yield a value V to the firm. Senior
leadership’s interests are interests are carried out through a VP, e.g., the vice president of R&D,
who oversees two functional managers (the agents), where each function is denoted by the subscript
i ∈ {a, b}.
Given the innovative nature of the strategic initiative, it only succeeds with probability, p.
However, this probability itself is not fully understood by all. Naturally, the functional managers,
those who execute the detailed tasks, have a better understanding of task-specific knowledge and
the inherent risks associated with their specific function. Yet, even their knowledge of p has
limitations. First, they may only be able to understand the specific details associated with their
own respective function. Second, even if they were to possess both function’s information, there
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would still exist some fundamental uncertainty associated with the overall initiative. Indeed, not
even full information allows the functional managers (or senior management) to know p, the exact
probability the initiative has to eventually succeed.
What is known is that the initiative’s exact probability of success, p is drawn from a beta
distribution f . We assume the risk profile, f , depends on two key factors: i) the resources each
function commits to the initiative, ei, and ii) each function’s capability, ηi. More specifically,
p ∼ Beta(αa, αb), where αa = ηaea and αb = (ηbeb)−1. As such, f(p;αa, αb) = (pαa−1(1 −
p)αb−1)(
∫ 1
0 u
αa−1(1 − u)αb−1du)−1, and the expected probability the initiative succeeds, E[p] =
eaηaebηb
1+eaηaebηb
. Note, that this specific functional form captures a key intuitive property, despite the
ambiguity associated with the new initiative’s probability of success: the likelihood that the initia-
tive has a high probability of success increases in each function’s resource commitment and in each
function’s capability.
More specifically, each function’s capability, ηi, parameterizes how hard it is for that function
to “move the needle” on the initiative’s likelihood of success. That is, we can think of ηiei as
the effectiveness of a function, such that a higher ηi makes each unit of effort that much more
effective. More importantly, though, is the combined capability of both functions, as captured
through N = ηaηb, which ultimately determines to what degree the organization can move the
needle on the likelihood of success. When the combined capability is higher, the likelihood that
the initiative succeeds increases to a greater degree for each unit of resources as compared to an
organization where the combined capability is lower. Said differently, when the organization’s
capability for an initiative is high, less resources are required to have a high likelihood of success.
In contrast, when the combined capability is low, the organization may exert substantial resources
and still struggle to succeed.
The VP knows each function’s capability follows a Bernoulli distribution g(ηi) with equal mass
placed on the probability a function possesses a high or low capability. For ease of exposition,
we assume the functions’ capabilities are symmetrically distributed. Again, what matters is the
distribution of the combined capability. Thus, each function is equally likely to realize either a high
capability, ηi = h, or a low capability, ηi = `, where 0 < ` < h. Although, on expectation, each
function is equally capable, each function’s realized capability could differ. Thus, each function’s
mean capability, E[ηi] = µ =
h+`
2 , and the coefficient of variation for each function’s capability is
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cv = h−`h+` . These two metrics are important because, ex-ante, the expected capability reflects the
degree to which the firm can increase their chances of success, and the coefficient of variation serves
as a proxy for the degree of asymmetry in the organization. Indeed, a low coefficient of variation
implies each function’s capability is fairly well understood.
In summary, our model formulation captures the following NPD process properties:
• It is impossible for either functional manager to fully compensate for the other stakeholders’
lack of capability or resource commitment.
• It is impossible to ex-post decouple the exact contribution of either manager to the success
or failure of an initiative.
• Even with significant investment of resources, there is always some level of residual risk that
represents the nature of innovation.
• There may exist a certain level of asymmetry of information among the stakeholders.
2.2 The implications of a successful, and failed, initiative
If the outcome of the initiative is successful, it yields the full opportunity V to the firm, while a
failed initiative yields no revenue at all. Independent of the outcome, however, the firm incurs the
total cost of the resources committed by both managers. Thus, when the initiative succeeds the
firm’s total profit is5: Π|success = V −∑i={a,b} ei; and when the initiative fails the total profit is
Π|failure = Πf = −
∑
i={a,b} ei.
Given the inherent uncertainty of the initiative, traditional agency theory would command
that senior leadership provides financial incentives to the functional managers, to induce them
to undertake the initiative. Thus, the VP may offer a simple pay-for-performance scheme in the
form of a linear contract wi + k1Πs, where wi represents the fixed wage portion of the contract
and k1 represents the share of the profits the VP offers to either functional manager. It follows,
that the VP, who acts as a proxy for the firm, has utility: Uf (·)|success = (1 − 2k1)(Πs) and
Uf (·)|failure = (Πf ).
The natural question, though, is what consequences do the managers face when the initiative
fails? In reality managers may experience different treatment following a failed initiative as opposed
5We adopt the following notational convention: X | success implies the “outcome X given successful execution.”
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to a successful one. There is ample evidence that different organizations treat managers in various
ways following the outcome of an initiative. To some extent, such unwritten rules characterize
“the way things are done” in a particular firm and reflect the organizational culture (Schein 2010,
Hermalin 2013). We focus on a particular dimension of the organizational culture that has recently
drawn more attention: the tolerance for failure (Manso 2011, Hutchison-Krupat and Chao 2014),
as expressed by the magnitude of the penalty the organization imposes on a manager following a
failed NPD initiative. In reality, failure may manifest itself through an abrupt stop in a subsequent
gate review, or portfolio meeting.
Based on first-hand discussions with senior NPD managers, we assume the penalty bestowed
upon the managers is proportionate to the total resources committed to the initiative. As an
example, functional managers may incur significant indirect costs upon failure, e.g. a diminished
intra-organizational status, reflected in the career paths or development programs the manager is
considered for. We incorporate the penalty through a parameter, k2 > 0, that expresses the penalty
per unit of resource “wasted” on a failed initiative. With this interpretation, we depart from the
common assumption of limited liability in principal-agent models. Since these penalties may not
necessarily reflect explicit policies of a firm, we assume that they are harder to change, at least
within the context of a single initiative.
In summary, when the initiative is successful the functional managers receive utility Ui(·)|success =
k1Πs and when the initiative fails the functional managers receive utility Ui(·)|failure = k2Πf for
i ∈ {a, b}. Our modeling assumptions serve two explicit goals:
• The utility functions are risk neutral. Our assumption aims to avoid any a-priori risk bias. We
do so in order to isolate the organizational effects, as opposed to individual behavioral traits,
a usual excuse provided to justify an organization’s lack of investment in risky initiatives
(see Bhattacharya and Mookherjee 1986, Hauser 1998, Brady 2005, Economist 2006, Hamm
2009).
• There is no explicit private cost for each of the functional managers. The only private com-
ponent is the functional capability, ηi. In that regard, we avoid any explicit misalignment
of objectives between the agents (managers) and the principal (VP), another highly cited
reason for an organization’s failure to pursue risky initiatives (Siemsen 2008, Mihm 2010,
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Figure 1: The sequence of events.
Manso 2011). In our model, the alignment between senior leadership’s objectives and those
of the managers is within senior leadership’s discretion6. It is straightforward to check that
the functional managers and the principal are aligned when k1 = k2/(1 + 2k2).
2.3 Defining NPD initiatives: In or out of the portfolio?
Within the previous context, we present the sequence of decisions that pertain to the definition and
pursuit of an initiative in Figure 1. Senior leadership outlines the strategic direction of the firm
and proposes a specific strategic initiative. The firm’s organizational structure dictates whether
the VP retains decision rights over each function’s resource commitments. Regardless of decision
rights, when there exists asymmetric information, the VP is unable to precisely determine, ex-post,
whether the resources committed by either manager are appropriate given their exact capability.
This early in the NPD process (i.e. the “fuzzy front-end”), there is not a 1-1 mapping between the
managers’ inputs, (ηi and ei) and the probability of success, p.
Senior leadership presents each of the functional managers with a common performance plan
that outlines: (i) whether or not the functional managers are empowered to choose the level of
resources that are committed to the initiative; and (ii) the share of profits, k1, the functional
managers would receive contingent upon the successful execution of the proposed NPD initiative.
Because the VP cannot decipher the exact contributions of either functional manager, she offers the
6Clearly, the degree to which a principal and an agent’s objectives are aligned is always within the principal’s
discretion. What is important here is that when there is a private cost of effort, as is typical, a linear contract does
not allow the principal to achieve full alignment; impose financial incentives such that the agent and the principal’s
preferred effort is the same given the same information.
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functional managers a common contract, where they each receive the same benefit proportional to
the initiative’s profit. Such incentives are not an artifact of our model; they have been advocated
in the literature (Che and Yoo 2001, Loch and Tapper 2002).
If the functional managers are empowered to choose their resource commitments, we model the
resulting consensus (or lack thereof) through the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous
move game. The simultaneous decision captures the salient features of the interactions: (i) it offers
a realistic proxy for the often advocated need to mutually agree upon an objective (e.g. no party
has an incentive to deviate; all stakeholders need to “buy into” the initiative); and (ii) it retains
the underlying interactions (e.g. each party accounts for the potential of no commitment from the
other side). Thus, if the functional managers reach an agreement and it satisfies the VP (who
maintains the authority to veto an initiative), then they pursue the initiative according to the
mutually agreed upon commitments. If no consensus is reached (no equilibrium exists), then we
assume the initiative is not pursued. Upon completion of the initiative, the outcome is either a
success or a failure, and rewards and recognition (or penalties) are distributed.
3 Model Analysis
We proceed with our model analysis as follows: First, we examine the optimal decisions of each
of the stakeholders in a setting of full information regarding the functional managers’ capabilities;
without any information asymmetry. Full information does not imply the the initiative lacks
uncertainty. Indeed, there still remains uncertainty regarding the probability of success, and the
eventual outcome.
Under full information, we analyze three scenarios. (i) The first-best scenario, where a cen-
tralized decision-maker (i.e., the proverbial master-mind) makes and executes all decisions, i.e., no
functional managers are required, an (unrealistic) scenario in which the VP chooses the resource
commitments and manages the detailed tasks of both functions; (ii) Task specialization without
empowerment, where the VP decides on the resource level to commit but relies on the functional
managers to execute on her resource decision, such that the VP only chooses incentive compensation
to satisfy the functional managers’ reservation utility; and (iii) Task specialization with empower-
ment, where the VP delegates the resource commitment decision to the functional managers, so
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that the VP must choose incentive compensation that induces the functional managers to commit
resource commitments.
Our analysis of the full information setting allows us to build intuition and to establish a bench-
mark for our subsequent analysis of asymmetric information. Throughout our analysis, we use the
superscript j ∈ {f, a} to denote the information structure, full information or asymmetric infor-
mation, respectively. Likewise, we use the superscript k ∈ {fb, c, d} to denote the locus of decision
rights, either first-best (no functional managers), centralized (the VP decides resource commit-
ments), or decentralized (functional managers decide resource commitments). Such that ef,da would
represent the resource commitment for function a in a setting where there is full information and
the decisions on resource commitments are decentralized (the functional managers are empowered).
3.1 Full information: first-best
In the first-best case neither the penalty for failure nor the incentives play a role in the VP’s
decision-making process. Indeed,the VP bears the full burden of any gain or loss resulting from
the initiative. However, for all other cases (when the functional managers are required) the VP
must share her reward and consider the penalty imposed on the functional managers when she
designs incentives. Of course, even when the functional managers carry out the management and
detailed allocation of resources, the VP still carries the full burden of the resources committed to
the initiative.
Senior leadership’s objective is to maximize her utility (firm profit) through her decision on
ea, eb. The following proposition describes the VP’s optimal decisions.
Proposition 1. First-best resource commitment
• The optimal centralized resource commitment, efba = efbb = efb implicitly solves:
Gfb(e) = e4N2 + 2e2N − eNV + 1 = 0, where N = ηaηb.
• The set of feasible initiatives is Pfb = {V,N ∈ R+ : V
√
N ≥ 4}
Proof. All proofs are provided in the Appendix to enhance readability.
Proposition 1 provides the optimal resource commitments for the firm in a first-best setting. The
resource commitment is symmetric for both functions and proportional to the overall capability
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of the organization (as captured by N = ηaηb). As the overall capability of the organization
increases, the resource commitment decreases, that is capability acts as a substitute for resources.
Furthermore, to address the question of how the characteristics of an organization affect its potential
to pursue various innovation objectives, we provide the first-best benchmark of feasible initiatives,
Pfb; the set of initiatives the firm can pursue and still expect a non-negative profit, given their
capabilities.
The feasible set of initiatives under the first-best echoes the same sentiment that Markowitz
(1952) captures with his notion of an attainable set of financial investments (Markowitz, 1952,
p. 85). Moreover, this feasible set serves as the benchmark upon which we provide a different
theoretical view of the portfolio of initiatives. That is, the first-best can be viewed as the set of
initiatives that could potentially be available under ideal (arguably unattainable) conditions. Then,
our subsequent analysis of the different organizational factors helps to delineate the feasible set of
initiatives that is attainable by a specific organization. Therefore, cross organizational comparisons
of portfolios without consideration for the organization itself are incomplete.
3.2 Full information: centralized decision rights and task specialization
A more realistic context than the first-best setting is one where there exists task specialization
such that the functional managers carry out the detailed management of the resources assigned
to an initiative. That is, the VP may still decide on the resource commitments for each function,
but the VP relies on the functional managers to ensure the resources are properly utilized. The
critical difference between the this setting and the first-best is that the VP must ensure that the
she provides adequate incentives for the functional managers to pursue the initiative. In other
words, the VP must provide incentives such that managers’ expected utility at least meets their
reservation utility7. We replicate the standard result of many full information, principal-agent
models in Economics (Akerlof 1970, Fudenberg and Tirole 1992): senior leadership pays both
managers a fixed wage equivalent to their expected penalty as a result of a failure. Since the
managers are risk neutral, they are indifferent between a fixed wage or an appropriately set, output
contingent, linear incentive (k1). As such, for expositional clarity and consistency, we report our
7Following prior literature, we normalize the reservation utility to zero. Reservation utilities different from zero
do not change the qualitative nature of the results.
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results in terms of the linear incentive scheme, k1.
Senior leadership’s optimal decisions reveal the realities of task specialization. Because the VP
is required to cover the participation constraint of the functional managers, the set of initiatives
she can feasibly pursue is reduced.
Proposition 2. Task specialization with centralized decision rights
i) The optimal resource commitment, ef,ca = e
f,c
a = ef,c solves:
Gf,c(e) = e4N2 + k2
(
2− 2e2N) + 2e2N − eNV + 1 = 0, the optimal incentive is kf,c1 =
2k2
ef,cNV−2(ef,c)2N , and e
f,c ≥ efb.
ii) The feasible set of initiatives is smaller than the first-best setting, Pf,c ⊆ Pfb.
iii) The feasible set of initiatives Pf,c becomes smaller as the penalty for failure, k2, increases.
Senior leadership must provide compensation to the functional managers to offset any exposure
they have to penalties they could experience if a failed initiative is realized. Naturally, managers
who are exposed to a larger penalty for failure require greater upside compensation to offset this
potential penalty. This means the VP is left with a smaller portion of profits when she pursues a new
initiative in a high penalty environment. This also means that an initiative that would be profitable
in a low penalty environment, might not be profitable in a high penalty one. Subsequently, the
feasible set of initiatives becomes smaller as the penalty for failure increases.
A full information setting in which there is specialization (functional managers) and the VP
decides on resource commitments results in an over-investment, as compared to a first-best setting.
Specialization requires the VP to sacrifice a portion of her surplus to ensure the functional managers’
participation constraint is met. To compensate for this, the VP over-invests, which results in a
higher probability of a successful outcome, albeit with higher cost. This result is managerially
relevant as it sheds light on an inherent trade-off that senior leadership faces. The probability of
success is increasing in the resource commitment; yet, an increase in the resource commitment has
a two-pronged impact: it directly increases cost, which also increases indirect costs. Specifically, an
increase in the cost means the functional managers are exposed to a larger penalty, which requires
the VP to increase the compensation to the functional managers, which is also more costly.
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3.3 Full information: delegated decision rights and task specialization
We now shift our analysis to a VP who delegates the resource commitment decision to the managers.
We analyze this setting to tease out the impact of information asymmetry in our subsequent
analysis. Indeed, when there is full information, and given the option, the VP would never choose
to delegate decision rights. Still, in a full information setting where decision rights are delegated, the
VP must ensure the incentives she offers the functional managers, at least, meets their participation
constraint. Moreover, she must set incentives to induce the functional managers to select a profit
maximizing resource level. Theorem 1 outlines the decisions for such a setting.
Theorem 1. The effect of specialization and delegation
i) The optimal resource commitment of each functional manager ef,da = e
f,d
b = e
f,d is always
larger than the VP’s resource commitment when she maintains decision rights; ef,d > ef,c >
efb.
ii) The VP’s decision on incentives is such that kf,d1 ≤ k2/(1 + 2k2).
iii) The set of feasible initiatives is independent of decision rights, Pf,d = Pf,c ⊂ Pfb.
Corollary 1. Decentralized profits
i) It is always more profitable for the firm to centralize the decision rights regarding resource
commitments.
ii) For initiatives strictly inside the feasible set, the incentive contract offered under centralized
decision rights will be greater than that offered under decentralized decision rights.
The VP always carries the full burden of both functions’ resource commitments, while she only
retains a portion of the profits if successful. Indeed, the VP’s objectives are driven by the ratio
between the profit she can retain following a success and the burden she must carry following a
failure. In contrast, the functional managers are exposed to some portion the initiative’s costs if
a failure is realized and some fraction of the profits, if the initiative is successful. As such, when
the functional managers are endowed with decision rights, their objective can also be defined by
the ratio between the incentive compensation they receive following a success as compared to the
penalty they incur if it fails.
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Specifically, the VP’s decisions are driven by the ratio between the impact they incur following
a failure as compared to the benefit they yield following a success, (1−2k1)ΠsΠf . And, if the functional
managers are endowed decision rights, then their decisions are driven by the ratio: k1Πsk2Πf . If the VP
were to align the objectives of the functional managers with those of her own–establish the same
relative exposure to upside and downside risk as herself–she could do so be setting k1 =
k2
1+2k2
.
However, under full information, the VP chooses to maximize profits by establishing kf,d1 < k2/(1+
2k2) for all initiatives in the interior of the feasible set and only for those on the boundary, i.e.,
where expected profit is zero, does she set kf,d1 = k2/(1 + 2k2). That is, the VP chooses to force
the functional managers to absorb a greater relative portion of the downside than she imposes on
herself.
Corollary 1 highlights the distinction between centralization and decentralization of decision
rights. First, it should come as no surprise that when endowed with full information, the VP would
never be better off delegating the decision on resource commitments; doing so only reduces her
profits. Regarding the incentives, Theorem 1 shows that the incentives offered to the managers are
equivalent at the boundary of the feasible set. However, as we move to the interior of the feasible
set, the incentives required under centralized decision rights are strictly greater than those required
when decision rights are decentralized.
We now turn to the more realistic context of the NPD front-end where senior leadership lacks
full information on the functional managers’ capabilities.
3.4 Asymmetric information: delegated decision rights
We assume that if functional managers, who have decision rights over their own resource commit-
ments, cannot reach a consensus then they do not pursue the initiative. Recall, the functional
managers’ capability is symmetrically distributed such that each function has an equal probability
of having either a high or low capability (i.e. η˜i ∈ {`, h} and P (η˜i = `) = P (η˜i = h) = 1/2). As
our interest is on the impact of information asymmetry, we operationalize the functional managers
capabilities such that η˜i ∈ {`, h} corresponds to η˜i ∈ {µ(1 − δ), µ(1 + δ)}, so that δ is linearly
proportional to the coefficient of variation.
There exist four possible realizations of the functional managers’ combined capability (three,
given the symmetry, since N = ηaηb = `h is equivalent to N = h`) such that if the VP wants
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to ensure a functional manager with a low realized capability pursues the initiative, she must
offer a higher incentive (k1). Thus, despite the VP’s desire to tailor the resource commitments
to the functional managers’ specific capability, she is limited in her ability to do so. Specifically,
she must choose incentives to induce the functional managers to only pursue the initiative if their
combined capability is sufficiently high. That is, she chooses an incentive for the minimum combined
capability she is willing to accept. We use an additional superscript m to denote the specific
performance plans, so that ka,d,``1 indicates that the VP seeks to induce the functional managers to
pursue the initiative independent of their capability; we suppress the a, d notation where possible for
expositional clarity. In line with prior results, trivially, khh1 < k
`h
1 < k
``
1 . Therefore, if decision rights
were delegated and the VP were to offer k1 < k
all
1 , and both functions realized a low capability,
then they would not choose to pursue the initiative. The theorem below outlines the key results
for an asymmetric setting.
Theorem 2. Delegation in the presence of information asymmetry
Let Nmin be the minimum combined capability for which the VP seeks to pursue the initiative.
i) If the functional managers realize a combined capability of
N˜ =
 Nmin then e
a,d = v4
N > Nmin then e
fb(N) < ea,d(N) < v4
ii) If Nmin = hh then e
a,d,hh = ef,d(N = hh).
iii) For Nmin < hh the set of feasible initiatives Pa,d(Nmin) ⊂ Pa,d,Nmin.
iv) For Nmin < hh there exists a threshold Vˆ (δ, k2) such that if V < Vˆ (δ, k2) then the VP chooses
k1 > k21+2k2 , otherwise k1 ≤ k21+2k2 .
Delegation offers the VP the ability to allocate decision rights to those who hold the best
knowledge of the organization’s capability to execute the initiative. If the VP delegates the resource
commitment decision and the minimum capabilities are realized, then she faces a similar situation
to the findings of Theorem 1: over-investment. There is a bright side, though. If the functions’
realized capability is greater than the VP’s minimum acceptable level, Nmin, then the managers’
over-investment in resources is reduced such that the resource commitment is closer to the first-best
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Figure 2: Feasible sets under delegated decision rights given the VP’s decision on Nmin and differing
penalties for failure.
level. Moreover, the higher the realized capability is, the closer the resource commitment is to the
first-best level. However, this does, of course, comes at the cost of the increased incentives.
Alternatively, the VP could increase her minimum acceptable capability. This has the benefit
of increasing the feasible set and decreasing the incentive she must offer. However, this too comes
at a significant cost. After all, an increase in the minimum capability means that the initiative
may not be pursued. When the VP delegates decision rights and offers a contract that induces
functional managers to pursue the initiative regardless of their true capability (ka,d,all1 ), she limits
the set of feasible initiatives to only those initiatives that are “doable” for the entire organization,
i.e., initiatives where it is well-understood that the functional capabilities exist (e.g. incremental
initiatives). This poses a significant challenge for the organization: to pursue the largest set of
initiatives requires an incentive plan of ka,d,hh1 . And while this allows the VP the same benefits she
has under full information, this translates to only a 25% chance that an initiative ultimately “gets
off the ground.” Indeed, the likelihood that both function’s capabilities for any given initiative are
high is P (ηa = h)P (ηb = h) = 1/4. These results are graphically depicted in Figure 2.
When decision rights are delegated and the VP seeks to pursue an initiative near the boundary of
the feasible set the VP always chooses incentives to align the organization in such a way that the firm
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Figure 3: The VP’s incentive decision and organizational alignment as it relates to the initiative’s
value for varying degrees of penalty for failure.
absorbs failure to a greater extent than the functional managers; the VP “protects” the managers.
The degree to which the VP seeks to protect the managers from potential penalties depends on just
how much the VP seeks to push the boundary (how close to the boundary she chooses to go), the
penalty for failure, and the minimum capability she is willing to accept. Specifically, as graphically
depicted in Figure 3, if the VP seeks to induce alignment similar to the full information case, she
must choose initiatives that are substantially inside the feasible set (i.e. at least 40% greater than
the minimum valued initiative the VP could pursue). Indeed, regardless of the magnitude of the
penalty for failure, and independent of whether Nmin = `` or Nmin = `h, the VP always needs to
offset the penalty with higher incentives if she wants the organization to adopt initiatives near the
boundary.
However, as with the feasible set, how she perceives an individual initiative also depends on
what she chooses as her minimum acceptable capability. It follows that there are initiatives for
which the VP would have to offer substantially high incentives (i.e., to protect the managers) under
an Nmin = `` contract but far lower incentives (those that shift burden to the managers) if instead
Nmin = `h. The same trade-off persists: the VP could choose this strategy, but doing so means
the initiative has a higher risk of never being launched.
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Figure 4: Incentives under centralized decision rights given the VP’s decision on Nmin and differing
penalties for failure.
3.4.1 Centralized decision rights in the face of asymmetry
As in the prior section, the VP does not know the each functions’ exact capability, while the
functional managers clearly do understand their own capability as well as their combined capability.
Similar to Theorem 2, the VP chooses incentives designed for the minimum functional capability
she is willing to accept. Thus, as with delegated asymmetric information, if she only seeks to pursue
the initiative when both functions are of a high capability, the analysis reverts to full information.
Theorem 3. Centralized decision rights in the presence of information asymmetry
i) For all Nmin < hh the set of feasible initiatives Pa,c,Nmin ⊂ Pa,d,Nmin.
ii) For all Nmin < hh, and sufficiently low V or high δ, the VP optimally chooses k
a,c
1 >
k2
(1+2k2)
.
In stark contrast to the full information setting, the feasible set of initiatives under centralized
decision rights is smaller than it is under delegated decision rights. The rationale comes from
Theorem 2, where we find that the resource commitments are not only tailored to the individual
functions’ capabilities, but they are tailored in a way that brings them closer to the first-best, thus
reducing inefficiency. In contrast, a VP who maintains decision rights must try to find a resource
commitment that balances all possible capabilities. Of course, the exception is if the VP chooses
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Nmin = hh. Such a strategy de-facto establishes full information at the cost of a lower likelihood
the initiative is eventually pursued.
In a similar manner to the case of delegated decision rights under asymmetric information in
concert with centralized decision rights implies the VP may need to offer an incentive that aligns the
organization in such a way that the functional managers’ impending penalties are offset by higher
incentives. However, just as the VP must offer lower incentives, on an absolute basis, when decision
rights are centralized, so too is the case with the degree to which she must offset the managers
penalties. In other words, centralized decision rights do not require the VP to offset penalties to
the same degree as she must do under delegation (see Figure 4 for a graphical depiction).
Despite the limitations placed on the feasible set and the higher incentives, there is a bright side
to centralized decision rights. Specifically, for projects inside the feasible set the VP can expect
higher profits when she maintains decision rights. Indeed, profitability can be exploited but doing
so limits the initiatives the organization views as feasible options. Figure 5 graphically depicts
the difference between profits when decision rights are centralized and when they are delegated for
varying degrees of information asymmetry. The vertical lines represent the boundary of the feasible
set under the different decision rights, where the centralized boundary is clearly inside the boundary
under delegation. Then, the curves represent the difference in profit for a given value for each level
of asymmetry. All curves start out where delegated is slightly more profitable, however, when
information asymmetry is low there are only a small portion of the initiatives are more profitable
under delegation. In contrast, when information asymmetry is more substantial, delegation offers
benefits even far inside the feasible set. Thus, the argument that centralized decision rights yield
more profits, may be true, yet this is only the case if the set of initiatives the firm considers is
restrictive as compared to what is possible.
4 Front-end portfolio decisions: An alternative perspective
In this section, we further discuss the core implications of our model analysis. We link our findings
to the following core managerial challenges: i) How are new NPD initiatives defined and what are
the resulting implications for the firm portfolio?; and ii) How does an organization’s tolerance for
failure affect how senior leadership aligns its own objectives with those of mid-level management?
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4.1 Defining NPD initiatives: challenges and insights
The nexus of this research lies in the challenges senior management faces when they must alter
the composition of their firm’s portfolio to promote an innovative NPD initiative and implement
a strategic objective. Traditionally, the portfolio selection problem has been approached as a
managerial decision, where the manager “selects from a menu”. As such, academics generally resort
to a series of mixed-integer programming formulations, i.e., “knapsack problems” (e.g. Fox et al.
1984), where the challenge is to choose the most valuable set of initiatives within the firm’s budget
capacity (Kavadias and Chao 2007). Such a perspective neglects an important dimension: portfolio
decisions are top-down strategic directives that get implemented at different organizational levels
(Anderson and Joglekar 2005, Bower and Gilbert 2005, Chao and Kavadias 2008, Hutchison-Krupat
and Kavadias 2014, Hutchison-Krupat 2017). These decisions are made even more challenging
because the knowledge required to implement these innovative initiatives is dispersed across multiple
functions (Sosa et al. 2002, Blindenbach-Driessen 2015, Schlapp et al. 2015, Hutchison-Krupat and
Kavadias 2017). As such, organizations find it difficult to define, support and implement strategic
initiatives (Bower 1970, Loch and Kavadias 2011, Kim et al. 2014). In other words, even if an
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initiative is feasible for some organization, it does not mean it is feasible for any organization.
Our view posits that there is a critical step that has received less attention, and as such,
is undervalued: an organization’s structure (decision rights and incentives), which enables (or
negates) the pursuit of specific strategic initiatives. Figure 2 (i) shows the effect that information
asymmetry has on the firm’s ability to implement strategic initiatives. Senior leadership, who faces
asymmetric information and offers incentives, experiences a significant reduction in the firm’s set
of feasible initiatives as this information asymmetry increases. Thus, despite the existence of an
innovative initiative, a specific organization may not view it as feasible, solely as a result of the
information asymmetry and the organizational dynamics between stakeholders.
So, if additional initiatives do potentially exist and match the firm’s strategy, what can senior
management do to enable their organization to pursue them? The firm has three potential levers:
the first two are short-term levers and include the ability to adjust the incentives and the allocation
of decision rights; the last is a long-term lever that requires senior leadership to influence the penalty
for failure and take control over a greater scope of decisions. What is interesting is that the former
strategies reflect the opening example of GSK, and the latter reflects the strategy of Wyeth.
An organization can expand its feasible set by ensuring that the initiative is only pursued if the
functional managers are, in fact, of a high capability. Yet, there is a significant trade-off: such an
incentive scheme is only possible a fraction of the time (i.e. on expectation 25%). This is simply
because there are a limited number of high-performance teams within the organization. Thus, while
it may be possible to push the organization in the short-term to pursue additional risky initiatives
through the provision of incentives, the limited utilization of resources may be an unsustainable
situation for the firm.
Empowering the NPD organization is beneficial, especially if the information asymmetry is
large. But large information asymmetries already imply a drastically reduced feasible set, and this
is surely not desirable trait, in and of itself. This findings complements the insights we gleaned
from incentives; neither of these short term remedies is a complete solution to the firm’s ability to
profitably pursue the largest set of initiatives.
Ultimately, longer term actions to lower the penalty for failure prove to be the path to achieving
sustainable results. The increase in the feasible set of initiatives that occurs as a result of such a shift
does not face the utilization challenges, as previously discussed. In other words, here the feasible set
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holds true for managers regardless of the capability of the function they oversee. However, again
we face a significant trade-off: substantial research shows that achieving such a “organizational
transformation” is an extremely difficult (some claim impossible) and costly process (Poole and
Van de Ven 2004). However, a reduction in the penalty for failure prompts senior leadership to
alter the organization’s alignment in non-obvious ways, as we discuss below.
Of course, what we have not captured, and what remains an interesting topic for future re-
search, is the dynamic relationship between information asymmetry and decision rights. That is,
when senior leadership takes away decision rights from functional managers, does this increase the
potential for greater information asymmetry?
4.2 The relationship between tolerance for failure and organizational alignment
Our analysis of both delegated and centralized decision rights under information asymmetry reveals
key drivers of organizational alignment. Specifically, as Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 reveal, absent
any information asymmetry the VP always (mis)aligns the organization in such a way that the
functional managers incur a greater relative burden for a failed initiative than the firm. Importantly,
this is independent of the penalty for failure the firm imposes. However, our analysis of the settings
in which there is information asymmetry reveals that the the VP may impose incentives that
(mis)align the organization in a such a way that the functional managers incur less of a burden than
the firm itself; the VP seeks to offset the potential penalties imposed on the functional managers
through the provision of incentives.
In particular, Theorem 2 and 3 provides insights on what drives the provision of incentives in
such a way that the organizational alignment shifts in such a way that the VP essentially protects the
functional managers from impending penalties through the provision of incentives. When decision
rights are delegated, far greater incentives are required to get the minimum capability manager
to pursue initiatives at the boundary of the (asymmetric) feasible set. Under both delegated and
centralized decision rights, increased information asymmetry increases the disparity between the
incentives the VP must offer when she chooses between different minimum capabilities. In other
words, when there is greater information asymmetry there is a greater chance that the VP would
not need to offer high incentives to protect the functional managers if she employs an Nmin = `h
incentive whereas she would need to offer such incentives if she employed an Nmin = `` incentive.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model to explore the impact that a firm’s structural decisions, incentives
and decision rights, have on the initiatives that ultimately make it into the firm’s NPD portfolio.
In that respect, we focus on the interactions between senior management (VP), who decides on the
incentives, and two functional managers, who oversee the contributions of their respective groups
during the collaborative implementation of the initiative. Two important dimensions determine
whether different initiatives are pursued: the asymmetry of information between senior leadership
and the functional managers who implement strategic initiatives, and the penalties imposed upon
failure.
Our analysis departs from the traditional view of portfolio decisions (Kavadias and Chao, 2007),
which focuses on an optimal allocation of resources given a menu of initiatives. In line with the
field-research beginning with Bower (1970), and in a manner similar to Markowitz (1952), we view
a firm’s portfolio decisions as being contingent on some “environmental” parameters. In the case of
Markowitz, these factors are an individual investor’s risk attitudes, and for us these factors are the
information asymmetry and the penalty for failure present in an organization. We view portfolio
initiatives as the result of a compromise among stakeholders. Indeed, different stakeholders must
support the implementation in a game theoretic sense, i.e. no party should have any incentive to
default on the initiative’s execution.
Our analysis provides complements existing literature that analyzes the portfolio decisions to
pursue given a specific initiative (with positive expected value). Rather than solely assume that
we have initiatives at our disposal that are interior to the feasible set, we evaluate how structural
decisions affect the initiatives an organization would even choose include in their consideration set.
This is, in fact, an important and fundamental consideration for senior leadership. Naturally, senior
leadership does not seek to make decisions that knowingly limit their potential to innovate. In that
light, our work aims to initiate a discussion on how a firm should align their NPD portfolio with
its NPD organization. Or, said differently, what type of an organization a firm should strive for if
it seeks a certain type of innovation portfolio.
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6 Appendix
For the proofs that follow, without loss of generality, we normalize the fixed wage portion, wi of
the contract offered to the managers to zero.
Lemma 1. Stakeholders’ expected utility when decision rights are centralized.
VP(firm): Centralized (implementation and decision rights): ufbf =
ηaeaηbebV
1+ηaeaηbeb
− (ea + eb); Centra-
lized decision rights (decentralized implementation): uf,cf = k1
ηaeaηbeb(V−ea−eb)
1+ηaeaηbeb
− (ea+eb)1+ηaeaηbeb
Managers: Decentralized implementation: ui = k1
ηaeaηbeb(V−ea−eb)
1+ηaeaηbeb
− k2 (ea+eb)1+ηaeaηbeb , i ∈ {a, b}
Proof. The centralized decision maker’s utility follows directly from evaluating: E[p | ei, ηi](V −∑
ei) − (1 − E[p | ei, ηi])(
∑
ei), i ∈ {a, b}. Similarly senior leadership with centralized decision
rights follows directly from evaluating: (1 − 2k1)E[p | ei, ηi](V −
∑
ei) − (1 − E[p | ei, ηi])(
∑
ei),
i ∈ {a, b}; and the utility of each of the managers when the task is decentralized follows from
evaluating: (k1)E[p | ei, ηi](V −
∑
ei)− k2(1− E[p | ei, ηi])(
∑
ei), i ∈ {a, b}
Proof of Proposition 1. The first-best decision maker k1 = k2 such that uf =
ηaeaηbebV
1+ηaeaηbeb
− (ea + eb)
For notational simplicity and without loss of generality we will use the notation N to represent ηaηb.
When we evaluate the gradient and hessian of uf for the optimal solution, the symmetry between
ea and eb is clear. In order to simplify the exposition of the centralized solution we evaluate the
concavity of the following equivalent representation (by symmetry of ea and eb): uf =
Ne2V
1+Ne2
−(2e).
When we do this, we find uf is concave for the domain e ∈ [ 1√3N ,∞]. Next we look at the domain
for which uf is non-negative. We find this to be e ∈ [V−
√
V 2−16/N
4 ,
V+
√
V 2−16/N
4 ]. Thus clearly
V 2N ≥ 16. As uf is increasing in V , this implies the necessary condition: V ≥ 4√N . We first show
that e∗(V = 4√
N
) ≥ 1√
3N
lies in the concave and non-negative domains for e. We can easily solve
for e∗(V = 4√
N
) = 1√
N
which clearly satisfies the concavity conditions and is the minimal feasible
e∗. Hence since uf is concave for all values greater than 1√3N and all e
∗ lie strictly in this region
any e∗ > 1√
N
is clearly a maximizer and must be non-negative. It follows that the feasible set of
initiatives for the centralized decision maker is Pfb = {N,V ∈ R+ : NV 2 ≥ 16}.
Proof of Proposition 2. The solution for the principal with full information and centralized decision
rights must satisfy the FOC such that ei =
√
2k1(1−2k1)(Ne2j−1)+(1−2k1)2NejV−(1−2k1)
Nej(1−2k1) , the condition
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on k1, namely that k
f,c
1 ≥ (ea+eb)k2ηaηbeaeb(V−ea−eb) presents the participation constraint (PC) of the ma-
nagers, obtained equating their expected utility to their reservation utility (normalized to 0). The
participation constraint (PC) of the managers is always binding. As such we can represent ef,ci as
ef,ci =
−1+
√
2k2(−1+Ne2j )+NejV
Nej
. This also allows us to represent the principal’s expected utility as
uf,cf =
Ne∗2(v−2e∗)−2e∗(1−2k2)
1+Ne∗2 .
We define the feasible set of initiatives as follows:
Recall, uf,cf =
Ne∗2(v−2e∗)−2e∗(1−2k2)
1+Ne∗2 . We contrast this with the first-best utility u
fb
f =
Nefb
2
(v−2efb)
1+Nefb2
and by inspection it is clear that for any k2 > 0 if u
c
f = 0 ⇒ uf,cf < 0. Thus we know that
Pf,c ⊂ Pfb. In order to meet the principal’s non-negativity constraint on uf,cf we must have
e∗ ≥ V4 −
√
NV 2−16(1+2k2)√
N
Which allows us to find the restriction necessary to define the feasible
set of initiatives for the f, c case; V ≥ 4
√
1+2k2√
N
. Thus we define Pf,c = {N,V ∈ R : V ≥ 4
√
1+2k2√
N
}.
Define the boundary of the respective sets: Pfbmin = {N,V ∈ R : V 2N = 16} and Pf,cmin = {N,V ∈
R : V 2N = 16(1 + 2k2)}, then clearly, as k2 increases the set Pf,c gets smaller. Fixing N and V we
have, Pf,cmin | k′2 lies above Pf,cmin | k2 for k′2 > k2
The effect of specialization and delegation
i) The optimal resource commitment of each functional manager ef,da = e
f,d
b = e
f,d is always
larger than the VP’s resource commitment when she maintains decision rights; ef,d > ef,c >
efb.
ii) The VP’s decision on incentives is such that kf,d1 < k2/(1 + 2k2).
iii) The set of feasible initiatives is independent of decision rights, Pf,d = Pf,c ⊂ Pfb.
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that udci =
k1ηaeaηbeb(V−ea−eb)
1+ηaeaηbeb
− k2(ea+eb)1+ηaeaηbeb . The FOC imply edci =√
k1(k2−k1)(Ne2j−1)+k21NejV−k1
Nejk1
. The same restrictions apply to the principal’s utility in the f, d case
as in the f, c case. Recall that in the f, c case the principal was obligated to satisfy the PC of the
managers. The feasible set for the f, c case was driven by the non-negativity of the principal. We
will show that ef,di is an upper bound for e
f,c
i . First we evaluate the best response of the managers
when their PC is binding. The best response reduces to: eBRi =
√
ejV , which greatly simplifies our
evaluation. The equilibrium becomes ef,di = e
f,d
j = V/4. Thus for all parameters the managers face
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the same relationship between V and e. As such in order to compare ef,ci and e
dc
i we can simply
evaluate ef,ci (V/4).
V
4 −
−4+
√
4NV 2+2k2(NV 2−16)
NV
?
> 0⇒ (NV 2−16)(NV 2−16−32k2) > 0, ∀V > 4√N and conclude
that edci > e
f,c
i > e
c
i . Furthermore as k2 → 0 ⇒ ef,ci → eci and as V,N → V,N : V = 4
√
1+2k2√
N
⇒
ef,ci → edci
Although ef,di weakly dominates e
f,c
i the feasible set of initiatives remains the same. We can
easily verify this by looking at the principal’s utility when e = V4 and k1 =
16k2
NV 2
, when we do
this we find uf (e
dc, kdc1 ) =
V (NV 2−16−32k2)
32+2NV 2
it follows that V > 4
√
1+2k2√
N
⇒ uf > 0 and hence
Pf,d = Pf,c = {N,V ∈ R : V ≥ 4
√
1+2k2√
N
}
The necessary condition for k1 when the managers PC is binding as: k
f,d
1 =
16k2
NV 2
, which was
obtained by substituting ea = eb = V/4 into k
f,d
1 =
(ea+eb)k2
ηaηbeaeb(V−ea−eb) .
Clearly to have k1 > k2 we would require that
k1
k2
= 1 +  = 16
NV 2
⇒ V = 4
(1+)
√
N
but
4
(1+)
√
N
< 4√
N
and hence does not lie in Pf,d (nor Pfb or Pf,c for that matter) and thus we find a
clear contradiction such that k1 < k2.
Decentralized profits
i) It is always more profitable for the firm to centralize the decision rights regarding resource
commitments.
ii) For initiatives strictly inside the feasible set, the incentive contract offered under centralized
decision rights will be greater than that offered under decentralized decision rights.
Proof of Corollary 1. i) Follows from the fact that senior leadership makes all decisions on k1, e
and can thus coordinate these optimally. ii)Recall the expected utility of the managers is ui =
k1
ηaeaηbeb(v−ea−eb)
1+ηaeaηbeb
− k2 (ea+eb)1+ηaeaηbeb When their participation constraint is binding (ui = 0): k1 =
(ea+eb)k2
ηaηbeaeb(v−ea−eb) We know from symmetry that ea = eb = e and substituting ηaηb = N we have:
k1(e) =
2ek2
Ne2(v−2e) =
2k2
Ne(v−2e) and
∂2k1
∂e2
=
4k2(12e2−6ev+v2)
e3n2(v−2e)3 . We know that v − 2e ≥ 0 (for there to
exist any chance of positive utility). Thus let h(e) = 12e2− 6ev+ v2 then if h(e) > 0 then we know
that k1 for which the participation constraint is binding is strictly convex. Solving h(e) = 0 yields
e = 112v
(
3±√−3), clearly there is no real solution. Yet we can see that h is a convex function
in e (∂
2h
∂e2
= 24), combine this with the knowledge that no real solution exists for which h(e) = 0
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and thus we know h is strictly positive. Therefore k1(e) is strictly convex and positive over the
range of feasible values of e. It follows that there is a unique e that minimizes k1(e), e = v/4
which is kf,d1 . It follows that for fixed v,N, k2, and feasible e (positive e and positive v − 2e) any
e : e 6= v/4⇒ k1 > kf,d1
Delegation in the presence of information asymmetry
Let Nmin be the minimum combined capability for which the VP seeks to pursue the initiative.
i) If the functional managers realize a combined capability of
N˜ =
 Nmin then e
a,d = v4
N > Nmin then e
fb(N) < ea,d(N) < v4
ii) If Nmin = hh then e
a,d,hh = ef,d(N = hh).
iii) For Nmin < hh the set of feasible initiatives Pa,d(Nmin) ⊂ Pa,d,Nmin .
iv) For Nmin < hh there exists a threshold δˆ(Nmin) such that only if δ < δˆ(Nmin) will a sufficiently
low V prompt the VP to choose k1 > k21+2k2 , otherwise k1 ≤ k21+2k2 .
Proof of Theorem 2. To simplify the exposition, we note the substitutability of η and V obtai-
ned in prior results. Thus, to simplify the exposition of the proofs ever so slightly, we normalize
µ = 1 (the proofs hold for µ 6= 1). When the realized capabilities N˜ = Nmin the effort reverts
to Theorem 1, where ea,d(Nmin) = e
f,d(N = Nmin). However, for N > Nmin we need to evaluate
the managers’ FOC. Doing so, we find that the managers effort must satisfy the implicit equation
Ga,d,N = 2N
(
e3N + 3e− V ) + (e2N − 1) (2e − V )Nmin = 0. We can implicitly differentiate the
effort with respect to N to find ∂e
a,d
∂N =
−4e3N+e2(V−2e)Nmin−6e+2V
Nmin(6e2N−2eNV−2)+6N(e2N+1) < 0.
The set of feasible initiatives is defined by finding k1 such that the Nmin managers’ PC is binding
and uf = 0:
When Nmin = `` = (1−δ)2 the managers’ PC is binding if k1 = 2k2(1−δ2)ea,d(V−2ea,d) and since ea,d`` =
V/4 this simplifies to k1 =
1
2(1−δ)2. And uf = 14
(
− 2ea,d,hh
(δ+1)2(ea,d,hh)2+1
+
(
4k2
(δ−1)2ea,d,``(2ea,d,``−V ) + 1
)(
(δ+1)2(ea,d,hh)2(V−2ea,d,hh)
(δ+1)2(ea,d,hh)2+1
+ (e
a,d,``−δea,d,``)2(V−2ea,d,``)
(δ−1)2(ea,d,``)2+1 +
2(1−δ2)(ea,d,`h)2(V−2ea,d,`h)
1−(δ2−1)(ea,d,`h)2
)
− 2ea,d,``
(δ−1)2(ea,d,``)2+1 +
4ea,d,`h
(δ2−1)(ea,d,`h)2−1
)
,
so that uf = 0 when
2((1−δ)2L2−2k2)
(1−δ)2L . So that uf (Nmin = ``) = 0 when V =
4
√
2k2
(1−δ)2 . Likewise,
uf (Nmin = `h) = 0 when V =
4
√
2k2
1−δ2 .// We then evaluate the incentive k1 at the boundary of the
feasible set, and find that ka,d,``1 =
1
2(1−δ)2. Thus, at the boundary of the feasible set ka,d,``1 > k21+2k2
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for all k2 if δ ≤ 12
(
2−√2), otherwise for δ > 12 (2−√2) if k2 < (1−δ)22δ(2−δ) it implies ka,d,``1 > k21+2k2 .
We can repeat this same procedure for Nmin = `h to find k
a,d,`h
1 >
k2
1+2k2
for all k2 if δ ≤ 1√2 ,
otherwise for δ > 1√
2
if k2 <
(1−δ)2
2δ2
it implies ka,d,``1 >
k2
1+2k2
Centralized decision rights in the presence of information asymmetry
Proof of Theorem 2. Follows directly from substituting the minimum viable initiative under dele-
gated decision rights (V a,dmin =
4
√
2k2
Nmin
) into the centralized decision rights profit to show it is always
negative.
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